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THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE 
ARGENTINE ECONOMY: 
THE PRIVATIZATION AND 
CONVERTIBILITY PROGRAMS 
Caren L. Strauss 
Introduction 
Throughout the 1980s Argentina endured 
a severe economic crisis. Like many of its Latin 
American neighbors, Argentina suffered from 
hyperinflation (which reached 4,923 percent per 
annum in 1989), an inefficient public sector, 
monetary devaluations and a substantial fiscal 
deficit. By the end of the decade the need for a 
more favorable macroeconomic environment 
had grown imperative; the need for a restruc-
turing, an economic overhaul, was clear. Under 
the direction of President Carlos Saul Menem 
and the Minister of Economy and Public Works 
and Services Domingo Cavallo, the government 
set out to restructure and in many respects res-
urrect the Argentine economy. 
Upon taking office in 1991, Cavallo insti-
tuted an economic stabilization plan, referred 
to as the "Cavallo Plan," to carry out Argentina's 
objectives. Perhaps the two most important 
23 
elements included in the program were the pri-
vatization and convertibility programs. The pri-
vatization program was designed as a means of 
reducing the country's inefficient public sector 
by selling off state-owned enterprises. These 
enterprises were a loss-making division of the 
economy, one that dominated heavy industry, 
natural resource exploitation and virtually all 
public services. Between 1989 and 1992 
Argentina privatized the majority of its public 
enterprises, yielding efficient, tax-paying, pri-
vately-owned companies. The convertibili ty 
program originates from the Convertibility Law, 
passed in March 1991, which requires the 
Central Bank of Argentina to back 100 percent 
of the economy's monetary base with gold, for-
eign exchange and other external assets such 
as liquid international investments. A key fac-
tor in this program is the requirement of the 
Central Bank to maintain a foreign exchange 
rate parity of one Argentine peso for one United 
States dollar. The convertibility program was 
designed as a catalyst for stability, economic 
recovery and growth within Argentina. Its pur-
pose is to serve as a comprehensive plan for the 
maintenance of both fiscal and monetary health 
in the Argentine public financial environment. 
The revitalization of the Argentine econ-
omy has not been easy. The privatization and 
convertibility programs have faced great diffi-
culty in their development, although they have 
indeed achieved substantial success. This paper 
will delve more deeply into the origins, pur-
poses and mechanics of the privatization and 
convertibility programs. In addition, it will 
investigate the current states and future 
prospects of the two programs within the con-
text of the evolving Argentine economy. 
The Privatization Program 
The privatization process involves the 
return of major business activities to the pri-
vate sector from the public sector, as well as the 
galvanization of the private sector through 
deregulation and the elimination of protec-
tionism. (Shapiro, p. 515) The key tool in a pri-
vatization process is the concept of a transfer. 
A transfer is the means by which publicly-
owned companies convey ownership to private 
firms. There exist two forms of transfer - the 
concession and the sale. A concession agree-
ment firmly states the precise rules under 
which a firm may operate locally. (Shapiro, 
p. 521) It is analogous to a lease as it allows pri-
vate companies to manage another company's 
assets for a period of time. Essentially, a con-
cession involves a contract with private firms 
to supply services for which the government 
continues to pay, rather than the outright sale 
of government assets. Alternatively, a sale can 
transpire between a publicly-owned company 
and a private firm. These two forms of transfer 
can occur independently, but are often com-
bined in some fashion. 
The Argentine privatization process began 
in 1990. The program's impetus was the eco-
nomic crisis that had reached an unmanage-
able level in late 1989. The hyperinflationary 
environment of the late 1980s had yielded a 
troubled Argentine economy, a poor fiscal sit-
uation plagued with debt, and inefficient state-
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owned companies. 
The public sector companies suffered a his-
tory of losses because of a complex regulatory 
environment involving import tariffs reaching 
a maximum of fifty percent in 1989, export 
taxes, and subsidies used to reduce the produc-
tion costs to local industry. (Ministerio de 
Economfa ... , Argentina: A Growing Nation, 
p. 32) However, these subsidies were available 
only to a small number of exporters. The effect 
of these measures on prices of foreign products 
sold in Argentina was to discourage the pur-
chase of these products and to encourage the 
purchase of substitute domestic products. A 
"buy Argentine" mentality also discouraged 
imports. This lack of exposure to competition 
hurt the Argentine economy. In addition, the 
government forced public sector companies to 
subordinate operations to a plethora of non-eco-
nomic objectives. For example, the government 
required the companies to conceal unemploy-
ment levels and to strengthen the union forces 
within them. Inefficient management struc-
tures also aggravated the country's problems. 
The Argentine government believed a pri-
vatization program would be the economy's 
panacea. The success of this program would be 
contingent upon three fundamental elements: 
deregulation, the availability of significant long-
term financing, and the establishment of an 
efficient management sector. 
The set of objectives outlined for the pri-
vatization program were the following: 
• To increase productive efficiency, 
specifically through reducing costs 
and by lessening the political influ-
ence of corporate entities; 
• To encourage investment; 
• To reduce the fiscal deficit; 
• To moderate internal restrictions on 
public-sector investment by reducing 
the size of the debt; 
• To channel funds previously allocated 
to non-profitable firms to those with 
more promising returns. (Kessler, p. 2) 
These objectives required a change in the 
legal framework designed for the handling of 
assets controlled by the state. Two acts laid the 
foundation for the privatization process of state-
owned companies and for the concession of 
public utilities. The first act, associated with 
State Reform No. 23,696/89 (Ley de Reforma 
del Estado No. 23.696/89) and otherwise known 
as the State Reform Law, established the basis 
for the privatization process in Argentina. This 
law authorized the partial or total privatization 
or liquidation of companies, corporations, 
establishments and productive properties total-
ly or partially owned by the state. In addition, 
the act established a way of determining who 
could purchase those companies to be priva-
tized and in what order they could do so: 
employees at any level of the company being 
privatized; customers of services provided by 
the agency; and producers of raw materials used 
as industrial input or processed as the main 
activity of the agency. (Ministerio de 
Economfa ... , Argentina: A Growing Nation, 
p. 4) The act also laid out the procedures for 
the capitalization of foreign debt instruments. 
The State Reform Law also stated that pri-
vatizations were to be executed in one, or a 
combination, of the following ways: sale of the 
assets as a unit or individually; sale of shares or 
blocks of capital stock; lease for a specified peri-
od (with or without an option to purchase); 
administration for a specific period (with or 
without a purchase option and concession); and 
license or permit. 
The second act, which laid the foundation 
for the successful management of the combined 
social and economic dangers created by eco-
nomic reforms in Argentina, was the Economic 
Emergency Act No. 23,697 (Ley Emergencia 
Economica No. 23,697). The key clauses of the 
act include: the suspension of subsidies that 
have a direct or indirect effect on the National 
Treasury, the Central Bank or state companies' 
resources; the declaration of equal treatment of 
both foreign and national capital; and the refor-
mation of the Central Bank's charter to allow it 
greater operating independence. 
The first part of the privatization process 
began early in 1990 and lasted until March 
1991. In light of the macroeconomic instabil-
ity at this time, the government employed mea-
sures to increase the profitability of the enter-
prises intended for privatization. For example, 
as a result of the government's efforts, the inter-
nal taxes on the operating activities of the tar-
geted companies were reduced. The state also 
initiated programs to improve the quality of 
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services transferred to the public. The improve-
ment, particularly with reference to telephone 
services, required a considerable flow of invest-
ment funds. 
This preliminary stage in the privatization 
process produced a set of minor transfers; and 
by the end of 1990, Aerolineas Argentina (the 
national airline) and the Empresa Nacional de 
Telecomunicaciones (ENTEL, the national tele-
phone company) were under private ownership. 
Before the privatization of ENTEL began, the 
company was losing $2 million a day. The gov-
ernment split the telephone company into two 
parts, selling sixty percent of each through 
debt-equity swaps. Citibank, backed by 
Telef6nica Espanola of Spain and the Argentine 
division of Italy's Techint, bought the southern 
part for $114 million in cash, in addition to can-
celling Argentine public-sector debt with a face-
value of $2.72 billion. Manufacturers Hanover 
Bank, with the United States regional telephone 
company Bell Atlantic and six other Argentine 
companies, acquired the northern part for $100 
million in cash and $2.3 billion in debt. Of the 
remaining forty percent, fifteen percent went 
to employees and suppliers and twenty-five per-
cent was sold to local investors and listed on the 
Buenos Aires stock exchange. (Giddy, p. 306) 
As a result of the privatization of these two 
companies alone, the state was able to reim-
burse United States creditor banks with over 
$6.6 billion worth of foreign bonds - this fig-
ure representing approximately ten percent of 
the total amount of Argentina's foreign debt for 
1990. In total, six firms were sold during this 
period and nine services were granted conces-
sion arrangements, including radio, television 
and oil. Argentina received $790 million in 
cash and approximately $6.8 billion in Treasury 
bonds from the United States as a result of the 
privatizations. This investment illustrates that 
the United States' confidence in Argentina had 
grown significantly. (Kessler, p. 4) 
The transfers implemented in the first 
stage of the privatization process had a signifi-
cant effect on the efficacy of the overall endeav-
or. Most importantly, the government signaled 
the intent of its future economic course by 
adopting a pro-market and non-interventionist 
policy. In addition, the beginning of the priva-
tization program served as an important learn-
ing process for Argentina. It demonstrated the 
imperative need for the maintenance of a clear 
regulatory framework and highlighted key areas 
for improvement. 
The second stage of the privatization 
process, from April1991 into 1992, was char-
acterized by the use of capital markets for the 
placement of thirty percent of the controlling 
stock of the privatized telephone companies. 
This placement of stock illustrated the first true 
effort by the Argentine government to increase 
the volume on the domestic capital market 
through privatizations. The increase in traded 
shares in the stock market contributed signifi-
cantly to the strengthening of the capital mar-
kets. Also during this period, problems in com-
panies already privatized were corrected, and 
guidelines were instituted to ensure the cre-
ation of regulatory entities to monitor the activ-
ities of the new companies and to increase 
investment requirements for the firms. 
Regulatory agencies were set up to cover 
the sectors of activity considered vital to the 
efficient operation of the economy. Due to the 
nature of the newly privatized markets, in par-
ticular the existence of natural monopolies and 
the potential for agreements between a limited 
number of producers, the state had to deter-
mine some way to regulate business activity. 
For example, within the public utility market, 
the following agencies were created: the 
National Telecommunications Commission, 
National Electricity Agency, National Gas 
Agency, Tripartite Water and Sanitation Agency 
and Highways Concession Control Board. 
The development of regulatory agencies, 
as well as other substantial changes made to the 
privatization process, brought the program 
even greater success. During 1992, the state 
sold 25 public companies, signed 31 oil con-
tracts for exploration with private firms and 
granted nine public utilities or companies in 
concession. (Kessler, p. 6) In April1992 a "sole 
payment criterion" was established whereby all 
privatizations which involved any amount of 
state revenue would have to be paid for both in 
cash and in foreign or domestic bonds. As a 
result of these transactions, the state received 
$5.1 million and decreased its debt by approxi-
mately $9.3 million. (Kessler, p. 6) 
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Yacimientos Petroliferos Fiscales 
The largest and perhaps the most effective 
privatization of an Argentine company occurred 
in 1993. Yacimientos Petroliferas Fiscales 
(YPF) is the biggest company headquartered in 
Argentina and is engaged in the oil and gas 
exploration and exploitation business. The 
company is also involved in the sale, transport 
and distribution of petroleum and petroleum 
derivatives, petrochemicals and liquified petro-
leum gas. YPF ranks first in publicly listed 
Argentine gas and oil companies in terms of 
estimated reserves; and if it were included in 
the United States' public list, YPF would rank 
eleventh. (Centro de Economfa Internacional, 
August 1993, p. 5) 
From the mid-1920s until 1990, the 
Argentine government maintained a monopoly 
in the Argentine gas and oil industry. It insti-
tuted numerous government policies through 
agencies and state companies, such as a nation-
al hydrocarbons plan, to regulate the actions 
and operations of the oil companies preceding 
the creation of YPF. These policies more often 
reflected political objectives rather than strate-
gies to maximize profitability. 
In 1989 the government began to take var-
ious measures to deregulate the oil and gas 
industry. This deregulation altered the monop-
olistic framework within which YPF operated, 
and gradually the company was able to enjoy 
the benefits of increased participation and 
investment by the private sector in the 
Argentine oil and gas industry. In August 1990 
the government designated a team to help YPF 
become a competitive and efficient corporation. 
The team's plan required the identification of 
the assets and strategic operations that would 
be essential for a privatized YPF. 
Decree 2778/90 dated December 31 , 1990 
(the Transformation Decree) determined the 
ultimate transformation of the state company 
into a corporation. On November 6, 1992, Law 
No. 24,145 on the Federalization of Hydro-
carbons and the Privatization of YPF came into 
effect. This Privatization Law established the 
procedure for privatization of the corporation 
and determined that 50 percent of the capital 
stock of the corporation was to be sold by the 
national government and the provinces within 
three years from the date of distribution of the 
shares of the corporation to the provinces. 
Various other important clauses of this 
Privatization Act include the following: 
• Assets of the corporation, other than 
rights over oil and gas exploration and 
exploitation, were sold subject to the 
limitation that such sales should not 
yield the purchase of a controlling 
interest in the market; 
• No administrative or regulatory 
legislation in effect at the date of 
approval of the law (or issued subse-
quently) regulating the administra-
tion, management and/or control of 
companies in which the Argentine 
government had a share were to be 
applicable to the corporation; 
• The corporation was granted explo-
ration permits and exploitation con-
cessions under the Hydrocarbons Law 
in select areas; 
• The provinces received transfer of 
ownership of the oil and gas reserves 
located within their territories upon 
expiration of the exploration permits 
and exploitation currently in effect. 
(Centro de Economfa Internacional, 
August 1993, p. 62) 
As specified by this Privatization Law, the 
government and provinces were to sell shares of 
the company in local and international markets. 
Unlike in previous privatizations, the govern-
ment established the market price on the basis 
of available information, setting the price at $19 
per share. (Centro de Economfa Internacional, 
August 1993, p. 64) The shares were sold world-
wide and were listed not only on the Buenos 
Aires stock exchange, but on both the New York 
and London stock exchanges as well. 
Towards the end of the first quarter of 
1993, the disposal of assets and agreements 
with third parties were virtually complete. The 
Privatization Act, coupled with efforts towards 
deregulation of the oil and gas industry, had 
been fruitful. Approximately 1,400 million bar-
rels of petroleum were sold to private compa-
nies, representing 34 percent of YPF's total 
reserves as of January 1, 1991. (Centro de 
Economfa Internacional, August 1993, p. 52) 
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The company created two strategic business 
groups to control operations: Upstream, for 
exploration and exploitation; and Downstream, 
for refining, transport and sales. In addition, a 
cost reduction program was designed to reduce 
the number of employees on the payroll. The 
personnel payroll of YPF was subsequently 
reduced from over 51,000 on December 31, 
1990, to approximately 10,600 on March 31, 
1993. (Centro de Economfa Internacional, 
August1993,p.52) 
As a result of these measures, YPF's finan-
cial position went from a loss of $576 million 
in 1990 to one of profit in both 1991 and 1992. 
(Centro de Economfa Internacional, August 
1993, p. 53) Mter the sale, the state retained 20 
percent of the shares and only minor represen-
tation on the board with the power to veto only 
key corporate decisions. (Centro de Economfa 
Internacional, August 1993, p. 33) The total 
proceeds of the YPF sale, $3.04 billion, repre-
sents the sale of 160 million shares of stock, or 
46 percent of the company. (Centro de 
Economfa Internacional, August 1993, p. 58) 
These proceeds were used by the Argentine gov-
ernment to pay benefits to retirees and to buy 
back debt owed to provincial governments. 
YPF has enjoyed great success from the 
privatization. The company has worked to 
maintain this success by taking advantage of 
the opportunities privatization has presented 
to it. It has implemented a four-prong strate-
gy to this end: to increase oil reserves and pro-
duction, to increase the efficiency of the refiner-
ies, to improve the network of YPF service 
stations, and to increase the sales of natural gas. 
Despite the obvious success enjoyed by 
YPF and many other privatized companies, it is 
important to note that the comprehensive pri-
vatization program was not carried out free of 
difficulty or setbacks. It was argued from the 
onset that the Argentine government may have 
lacked both the expertise and the political sup-
port to initiate an effective privatization strat-
egy. A particularly pervasive question was 
whether or not the private sector would be able 
to perform at a level capable of supporting the 
proposed economic reforms. The Argentine pri-
vatization process was also often delayed by 
poor scheduling, bureaucratic roadblocks and 
powerful union opposition. 
Nonetheless, the financial and economic 
results of the privatization program are many. 
The Argentine privatization process has covered 
most of the public companies once held by the 
government, as well as a broad spectrum of 
industries ranging from the telephone, elec-
tricity, water and gas industries to petroleum, 
shipyards and steel mills. The methods of 
transfer have yielded a significant inflow of 
funds to the public sector and have allowed for 
the repayment of a large portion of the nation-
al debt. In total, approximately $5.6 billion in 
cash and $4.5 billion in government securities 
has been repaid, and $1.6 billion in liabilities 
has been transferred to new owners or conces-
sion-holders. (Ministerio de Economfa ... , 
Argentina: A Growing Nation, p. 17) In addi-
tion, according to Argentina's economic report 
for 1993, Argentina's total cash income from 
privatizations to date has been $9.7 billion, and 
the total income from cancellation of domestic 
and foreign public debt has been $13.425 bil-
lion. (Ministerio de Economfa ... , Republica 
Argentina, May 1993, p. 121) 
Competition among companies has 
increased a great deal because of privatization. 
The increase in competition has forced compa-
nies to reduce costs and thereby to become 
more efficient, just as it has also compelled the 
private sector to take a greater interest in the 
overall economy. The private sector has worked 
hard to cut costs, to improve quality of service 
· and to spur innovation -all in the best inter-
est of the overall Argentine economy. Foreign 
investment has increased in Argentina as well 
since investors no longer harbor a great fear of 
the country's problems with hyperinflation and 
monetary devaluations. 
The privatization process has not only 
involved domestic participants. A large num-
ber of foreign economic groups, governments, 
corporations and companies have participated 
in the program, such as British Gas and Italy's 
STET. (Argentina Survey, p. 6) The United 
States has been a key participant as well. By 
early 1993 U.S. companies had invested over 
twelve percent of the more than $8 billion gen-
erated by the privatizations. ("Argentina and the 
United States ... ," p. 8) U.S. consulting firms 
such as Arthur Andersen and Price Waterhouse 
have helped to prepare state firms for privati-
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zation and have advised private sector con-
glomerates in the bidding process. 
Such U.S. financial institutions as 
Citibank, J.P. Morgan and Bank of Boston have 
also supported U.S., Argentine and foreign bid-
ders. In fact, when YPF was privatized in June 
1993, it was primarily through a sale in excess 
of $2 billion worth of American depository 
receipts (ADRs) on Wall Street- a sale that 
received a great deal of help from Merrill Lynch 
and First Boston. American depository receipts 
are negotiable receipts representing ownership 
of stock in a foreign corporation that are issued 
by an American bank. These receipts represent 
shares on deposit with the American bank's for-
eign office. The YPF transaction was one of the 
largest initial offerings ever in the U.S. financial 
market; and as of March 1994, an estimated 45 
percent of YPF shares are now owned by both 
individual and corporate American investors. 
("Argentina and the United States ... ," p. 8) 
The Convertibility Plan 
The second critical element of the 
Argentine economic stabilization plan was the 
convertibility program. Since' the 1950s, the 
Argentine financial system had been heavily 
regulated. Nominal interest rates were set by 
the government, an operation which created· 
economic problems. The governmental deter-
mination of nominal rates sometimes resulted 
in negative real interest rates; as a result dis-
tortions in the allocation of resources occurred, 
and a system of implicit subsidy and taxation 
materialized. These subsidies directly and indi-
rectly affected the National Treasury, the 
Central Bank and state companies' resources. 
(Ministerio de Economfa ... , Argentina: A 
Growing Nation, p. 25) 
In the 1970s Argentina wanted to end the 
strong regulation governing its economic sys-
tem and to move towards a more liberal strate-
gy. A major reform was instituted in June 1977 
when interest rates were freed on loans and on 
savings accounts and term deposits. In addi-
tion, banks were given full autonomy to choose 
their customers, implying that the Central Bank 
or any other public entity could no longer exer-
cise any control over them. (Centro de 
Economfa Internacional, June 1993, p. 42) 
In 1982, however, financial policy revert-
ed back to one of increased regulation so that 
the government could handle a high level of 
public company indebtedness with banks. This 
indebtedness was the result of an increased 
demand for credit in the public sector. The 
increased regulation took the form of high 
reserve requirements and rediscounts for banks 
and regulated interest rates. The Central Bank 
again became the principal intermediary in the 
financial system. However, at the same time 
monetary authorities lost control over the 
money supply as reserve requirements were 
used as borrowing by the government in order 
to obtain funds to subsidize the private sector. 
This already difficult situation was wors-
ened by the hyperinflation in Argentina during 
the 1980s. The Central Bank was not able to 
maintain renumeration of reserves, which is the 
minimum level of reserves necessary for a sus-
tainable balance of payments. The overall sur-
plus or deficit in a country's balance of pay-
ments is a function of a central bank's reserves. 
If a central bank's reserves decrease, due to an 
increase in exports or a decrease in capital 
inflows, an overall deficit will materialize. Due 
to a decrease in Central Bank's reserves, an 
uncontrollable financial deficit was created in 
Argentina. The country realized that only a 
reform of great magnitude could eliminate the 
deficit as well as deal with the fundamental 
problems in the economic system. 
Argentina worked hard to construct an 
appropriate reform program, and in April1991 
the Convertibility Plan was launched. This plan 
was based upon the Convertibility Law (Law No. 
23,928) dated March 1991. The Convertibility 
Law created the peso, the unit of currency used 
in Argentina today. The law established that as 
of January 1, 1992, coins and notes issued by 
the Argentine Central Bank would bear the 
denomination "peso" and the sign"$." (Centro 
de Economfa Internacional, June 1993, p. 44) 
The plan's framework was intended to bring 
about strict monetary and fiscal control. 
Perhaps the most important component 
of the law was the parity and convertibility con-
ditions it created for the new unit of currency. 
Parity was set at one peso ($1) for each ten 
thousand australes (A=10,000), the former unit 
of Argentine currency. Convertibility was estab-
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lished with the United States dollar at the rate 
of one peso for each U.S. dollar. 
The law was set up in such a way as to 
ameliorate the difficult reserve situation the 
Central Bank suffered. The law imposed on the 
Argentine Central Bank the obligation to sell 
reserves readily at the rate of 10,000 australes, 
or one peso, per dollar while maintaining at all 
times sufficient international reserves to cover 
the monetary base. These international 
reserves could include gold and foreign cur-
rency, liquid international investments, and 
government securities not in excess of ten per-
cent of total reserves. (Centro de Economfa 
Internacional, June 1993, p. 47) This limita-
tion on government securities as a percentage 
of total reserves prohibited the Central Bank 
from financing the public debt and from gen-
erating internal credit. In this way, reserves 
would no longer be used to fund government 
expenditures and the monetary base would 
remain under control. 
The Convertibility Plan enhanced the 
Argentine economy's credibility immensely. 
Inflation fell from 27 percent for the month of 
February 1991 to a rate of less than two percent 
per month within only two months. This 
decrease brought the Argentine inflation rate 
much closer to worldwide rates, especially in 
the case of wholesale prices. Nominal interest 
rates also fell rapidly to levels close to 20 per-
cent (per annum); and since inflation was 
decreasing, real interest rates in terms of both 
australes and dollars decreased as well. (Centro 
de Economfa Internacional, June 1993, p. 47) 
In addition, monetary policy was greatly 
simplified. For example, if there were an excess 
demand for pesos over dollars, the interest rate 
would rise until the exchange rate for the dol-
lar fell below 0.99 pesos per dollar, at which 
time the Central Bank would purchase dollars, 
thereby restoring liquidity. In other words, the 
Central Bank would buy U.S. dollars with pesos 
in order to push the peso above 0.99 pesos per 
dollar. This purchase would add greater liq-
uidity to the Central Bank's reserves. 
Essentially, monetary policy would be aimed to 
ensure that there would be no differential what-
soever between operations in pesos and those 
in dollars. It is interesting to note that all bank 
accounts are allowed in either pesos or dollars, 
and banks can meet their reserve requirements 
using either currency. (Centro de Economfa 
Internacional, June 1993, p. 47) 
The Convertibility Program in effect led to 
a substantial growth in monetary aggregates, 
including notes, coins, savings deposits and 
term deposits . The program caused a marked 
increase in the real demand for money (both 
pesos and dollars). Total deposits in pesos more 
than doubled, and deposits in dollars grew 
rapidly. It is important to recognize that the 
growth in the total of both types of deposits was 
considerable for a country that had endured 
such a long period of hyperinflation. 
The increase in the monetary base that 
began in April 1991 also reflects a sizeable 
increase in capital inflows. This inflow of funds 
was in large part due to the many privatizations 
being carried out. In addition, it was a result of 
the growth of capital markets which followed the 
signing of a agreement in early 1992 with the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF). This agree-
ment provided Argentina with access to IMF 
resources for the financing of debt reduction 
agreements and assisted in a return to interna-
tional credit markets. The three-year program 
which Argentina submitted for agreement to the 
IMF covers the monetary, fiscal and borrowing 
policies for the period of 1992-94 in order to 
ensure balanced public accounts and to improve 
the country's solvency. (Ministerio de Econo-
mfa ... , Argentina: A Growing Nation , p. 20) 
The significant decline in interest rates in 
line with lower predicted levels of inflation has 
also reduced the exchange and country risk 
normally associated with Argentina. Exchange 
risk is the product of the immediate adjustment 
of quotes as traders receive and interpret new 
political and economic information. These 
adjustments cause both exchange losses and 
gains by banks active in the foreign exchange 
market. Country risk involves the economic 
and social factors that contribute to the gener-
al level of risk in the country as a whole. Due 
to the decrease in country risk resulting from 
the Convertibility Plan, there has been a large 
growth in offers of financing to Argentina from 
foreign sources. The financing has been offered 
for both the private and non-financial sectors, 
foreign-trade related operations and financial 
loans. (Shapiro, pp. 42, 511) 
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Convertibility has also resulted in a strong 
growth in lending. Financial institutions have 
enjoyed a rapid expansion in their lending abil-
ities due to the remonetization of pesos and dol-
lars. The process of remonetization is analo-
gous to the U.S. central bank's open market 
purchases whereby additional liquidity is inject-
ed into the economy. In addition, increases in 
purchasing power and family incomes have 
resulted in more purchases of consumer goods 
and other services, necessitating increases in 
credit. Companies have also required loans in 
order to be able to satisfy increases in demand, 
to extend more credit to customers, to carry out 
industrial reconstruction and to take part in the 
privatization program. (Centro de Economfa 
Internacional, June 1993, p. 52) 
Not all of the effects of the new Argentine 
exchange rate parity have been beneficial to the 
economy, however. As a result of the 
Convertibility Plan's success in opening up the 
economy and in encouraging investment, there 
has been a marked increase in imports (mostly 
in capital goods) to Argentina. Consequently, 
substantial trade and current account deficits 
have developed, and the peso is now considered 
overvalued. In 1993 the trade balance was in 
deficit by about 3. 7 billion dollars. (Arthur 
Andersen, p. 4) 
The fact that the peso is overvalued makes 
Argentine products less competitive in the 
international market, and thus causes the vol-
ume of imports to be greater than exports. In 
1993 exports comprised approximately five per-
cent of Argentina's gross domestic product, and 
imports approximately seven percent. (United 
States Embassy, p. 5) Imports have increased 
dramatically since 1990; and although exports 
were sluggish from 1990 to 1992 and have since 
increased, the increase has not been great 
enough to eliminate the trade deficit. The cur-
rent account deficit (a current account deficit 
indicates that a country is a net capital 
importer) has been more than offset by capital 
inflows (e.g., venture capital) , however. 
Future Prospects 
Little now remains to be privatized in 
Argentina. Those state firms yet to be priva-
tized are largely provincial rather than federal. 
In the future it is likely that the government 
will sell off the large blocks of stock it still 
retains in the privatized firms. The government 
will also continue to deregulate the economy 
in an attempt to reduce the role it plays in the 
business operations of the private sector. 
The Cavallo Plan has already received con-
siderable support; and considering the unpop-
ular inflationary period of only four years ago, 
it is expected to maintain its backing. However, 
the privatization program has prompted the 
necessity of reforms in other areas. Labor laws, 
bankruptcy codes and intellectual property pro-
tection are among the major areas targeted for 
changes. 
The parity exchange rate between the peso 
and the dollar may or may not be manageable 
over the foreseeable future. Some people 
believe that the system will be able to be main-
tained while others do not, since the peso is 
currently overvalued. In addition, in the wake 
of the Mexican peso crisis, the possibility that 
the Mexican peso devaluation will affect 
Argentina's convertibility law is quite discon-
certing to the Argentine political and econom-
ic communities. The fear is that the Mexican 
peso devaluation could cause Argentina's image 
to suffer. Severe troubles in raising financing 
from international investors for Argentina 
could mean that the Argentine exchange rate 
system would become unsustainable. Argentina 
relies on capital inflows to prop up the trade 
deficit that has resulted from an overvalued 
Argentine peso. 
An important question is whether or not 
Argentina should devalue the peso. In general, 
forcing a currency below its equilibrium level 
causes inflation; in this regard, a devaluation 
can improve competitiveness only to the extent 
that it does not cause higher inflation. If 
Argentina were to devaluate the peso and 
domestic wages and prices were to rise, any gain 
in competitiveness in the international market 
might disappear. Argentina's economy is 
almost entirely "dollarized," meaning that both 
households and businesses hold both assets and 
liabilities in dollars. For example, sixty percent 
of the debts of Argentina's 150 largest compa-
nies are dollar-denominated. (Argentina Survey, 
p. 4) In addition, many indices for prices, such 
as fuel, electricity and telecommunications, are 
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quoted in dollars, often by law. (Smith Barney, 
p. 8) Clearly, any change in the dollar-peso 
exchange rate would be reflected almost 
instantly in higher prices, and a devaluation 
would increase the burden of loan obligations 
expressed in pesos. 
It is, therefore, likely that the political and 
social consequences of a devaluation would be 
far worse than the effects of a recession possi-
bly brought on by the continuation of the cur-
rent dollar-peso exchange rate. The Argentine 
government is convinced that devaluations have 
been used in the past as a refuge serving only to 
disguise bad economic decisions that have 
resulted in significant capital flight and hyper-
inflation; thus, it believes that the only means 
for economic recovery is by way of increased 
investment and productivity and lower produc-
tion costs. (Ministerio de Economfa ... , 
Argentina: A Growing Nation, p. 60) 
Increased investment has fortunately 
already materialized. The fixed exchange rate 
system has put pressure on Argentine manu-
facturers to invest a great deal in order to com-
bat international competition. It is expected 
that the character of Argentina's investment 
will change from the improvement of existing 
capacity to an expansion of the productive base 
in order to export high value-added products. 
(United States Embassy, p. 4) The initiative to 
invest has also been, and will continue to be, 
very strong in the sectors of telecommunica-
tions, power generation, air and land transport, 
and health services. Imports from the U.S. have 
been critical for investment in these sectors. It 
will be essential that the United States and 
other countries continue to provide Argentina 
with what it needs to improve its outdated 
industrial and service bases. 
Conclusion 
As a result of the transformation of its 
economy, Argentina today has one of the 
world's most open economies. The country has 
made economic progress on both internal and 
external fronts. The convertibility and privati-
zation programs have helped Argentina to 
achieve significant levels of internal stability 
and growth. This internal stability and growth 
has in turn increased foreign investor confi-
dence in Argentina, improving the country's 
position in the international markets. 
The Argentine government remains firm 
in its stand against a devaluation of the peso and 
in favor of a reduction of production costs and 
an increase in investment. One can expect to 
see the reduction in production costs achieved 
through a reduction of financial costs in the pri-
vate sector, involving further decreases in 
Argentine interest rates, tax reform in the 
provinces, and export tax reimbursements and 
the elimination of export taxes. (Ministerio de 
Economfa ... , Argentina: A Growing Nation, 
p. 27) Investment will be in those areas of pro-
duction that will yield a more desirable 
Argentine product: for example, high-value-
added crops, primarily fruits, products for 
which there is both high international as well 
as domestic demand. 
The Argentine economy appears to be 
headed towards a continued process of mod-
ernization. Argentina is likely to persist in its 
efforts to improve the efficiency of its economy, 
with the success of reforms to date and a more 
stable political environment supporting its 
endeavors. Argentina represents one of the 
most flourishing emerging economies in Latin 
America and should take pride in both its 
accomplishments and its promise of a bright, 
prosperous future. 
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